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26 August 1993



**FOREIGN  
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## ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-027

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26 August 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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### South Africa

#### Draft Nuclear Legislation Published

*MB2308131793 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1153 GMT 23 Aug 93*

[By Ben MacIennan]

[Text] Cape Town Aug 23 SAPA—Draft legislation which will sweep away the statutes that shroud South Africa's nuclear industry in secrecy has been published in Cape Town. The Nuclear Energy Bill, designed to replace the existing Nuclear Energy Act, will scrap two full pages of restrictions on disclosure of information on the sources of minerals for the industry and their marketing and prices, on nuclear research, on certain court cases and on "anything done by the minister (of mineral and energy affairs) or the (atomic energy corporation) under this act".

The only restriction affecting the media in the new measure is that, without the permission of the executive officer of the Council for Nuclear Safety, no-one may publish any information on any nuclear installation,

which in the executive officer's opinion may jeopardise the installation's security arrangements. It will also be an offence for anyone to receive such information knowing it has been communicated to him in contravention of the law. For a contravention of this section, the bill proposes a fine and up to seven years in jail. The maximum jail sentence under the existing act for unlawful disclosure of information is 20 years.

According to the memorandum, the bill is also designed to:

- enable the Atomic Energy Agency [AEC], as South Africa's national authority for nuclear affairs, to fulfil its obligations under the comprehensive agreement on nuclear safeguards signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1991;
- bring the functions and powers of the AEC into harmony with its "ideal to develop technology and to utilise technological expertise"; and
- extend the powers of the Council for Nuclear Safety to establish it as the national authority governing safe transport of radioactive material.

## Presence of Chemical Weapons on Cargo Ship Denied

### President Says Ship Contains No Chemical Weapons

OW1808121693 Tokyo KYODO in English 1156 GMT  
18 Aug 93

[Text] Beijing, Aug. 18 KYODO—President Jiang Zemin told a delegation of nine U.S. Congressmen on Wednesday [18 August] that a suspect Chinese cargo ship is not carrying ingredients used to make chemical weapons.

"General Secretary (Jiang) said there are no chemical weapons aboard that ship," Congressman Sam Gibbons told reporters after talks with the Chinese president, who also serves as Communist Party boss.

Jiang was referring to the Yinhe, a cargo ship which has been afloat in the Gulf of Oman for nearly two weeks and which the United States has accused of carrying two banned substances used in chemical weapons.

The shipment is believed to be bound for Iran.

The Chinese side has adamantly denied the accusations and protested against U.S. interference in the matter, calling the U.S. "a self-appointed global policeman."

The U.S. first brought the matter to Chinese attention during the last week of July and has since denied that it has interfered with the progress of the ship, while admitting that the U.S. Navy is monitoring its movements.

Last week the United Arab Emirates denied the ship docking privileges to its ports, which are main transfer points for Iranian-bound containers.

The Chinese side claims that the Iranian-bound containers are carrying nothing more than paper goods, hardware and machine parts and say that the U.S. has refused a third country inspection.

The controversy has highlighted U.S. determination to uphold internationally recognized weapons proliferation agreements, like the chemical weapons convention, which China recognizes.

Last month the U.S. accused China of violating the guidelines of the missile technology control regime by selling missile components to Pakistan.

Jiang, the highest Chinese leader to comment on the chemical weapons controversy, made the statement to the delegation which is comprised of trade subcommittee members of the House of Representatives' Ways and Means Committee.

The members arrived in Beijing on Sunday for a five-day visit.

## Editorial Criticizes U.S. for Intercepting Merchant Ship

HK1808095193 Hong Kong WEN WEI PO in Chinese  
18 Aug 93 p 2

[Editorial: "Excuse for Intercepting Merchant Ship Is Absurd"]

[Text] Eight days after leaving Xingang on its way to Kuwait, China's cargo liner the Yinhe was shadowed, interfered with, and photographed by U.S. warships and aircraft. In the meantime, the United States made many complaints to China, charging that the Yinhe cargo liner is carrying thiodiglycol and thionylchloride, chemical weapons materials, to Iran. The United States has also made the unreasonable demands that first, the Chinese side call the Yinhe back; second, it allow an inspection by U.S. personnel on board the ship; and third, the United States be allowed to take action to stop the chemicals from falling into inappropriate hands.

The Chinese side has responded to the unreasonable U.S. acts very solemnly. The first step was that it has checked and inspected the Yinhe's shipping bill, bill of lading, list of cargo owners, and the port of unloading, and has informed the U.S. side of results of the inspections. Moreover, in an interview with a Voice of America reporter, Assistant Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Huasun also mentioned details of the Yinhe's cargoes.

The Chinese side's second step was that the Chinese merchant ship continued on its journey to the original port without fearing the threat of U.S. warships and aircraft.

The Chinese side's third step was to lodge a protest through diplomatic means, demanding that the U.S. side be held responsible for all consequences caused, including repaying the enormous economic losses suffered by the Chinese side. The Chinese side has made a positive proposal that in order to eliminate the consequences caused by incorrect intelligence, all cargoes be inspected by a third party after the Yinhe has unloaded them at the port to see whether the ship contains thiodiglycol and thionylchloride as alleged by U.S. intelligence.

The Chinese side's attitude and way of handling the matter is fair and reasonable. If the United States respects international law, it should handle the matter in keeping with international practice. If not, it defies laws. If the United States' sea-bully logic stood at a time when it claims its act conforms to international law, then the world order would be completely disrupted and any country could follow suit by falsely charging that the merchant ships of another country carry contraband goods and intercept them with warships and aircraft so that they could not enter their ports of destination and they could only return to their ports of departure. By returning to the ports of departure, these countries would have "no proof whatsoever" and would suffer enormous losses and could not vindicate the unredressed injustice.

If we allowed such a matter to become legal, then the world would only become one of sea bullies and the sailing right of regular merchant ships would be infringed on and free trade would be trampled on. This U.S. practice shows that the United States wants to obtain the authority of "world judge" and "world policeman" on the excuse of the Yinhe incident, and that as long as U.S. intelligence says you are wrong, you are wrong. This is the greatest of dictatorships and the dictatorship of a superpower over numerous other Third World countries. It is, as we can say, extremely ironic that the United States, which mentions "democracy" every day, could have perpetrated this imperious and arbitrary act.

How on earth did the United States get the intelligence? How credible is it? China has made a solemn and just refutation that the so-called "intelligence" of the U.S. side is all erroneous. First, it has a mistaken idea of what type of ship the Yinhe is and is mistaken regarding its navigation route. The Yinhe is a container ship, not a bulk cargo ship, and it cannot reach a port without a container terminal. Iran's Bandar Abbas has no facilities to load and unload containers, whereas the "intelligence" says the Yinhe's cargo is being transported to Bandar Abbas. The Yinhe is a regular ship whose route is Xingang—Shanghai—Hong Kong—Singapore—Jakarta—Dubai—Ad Dammam—Kuwait. But the "intelligence" says the ship departed from Dalian for Bandar Abbas. It did not name the ports of departure and destination correctly. Third, the "intelligence" about the loaded commodities is most erroneous. Eighty percent of the containers on board the ship are being shipped to Dubai, 24 containers of which are stationery, metals, and machine parts to be unloaded at Dubai.

If the United States wants to find out the truth, it should allow facts to verify whether its intelligence is correct or not and should allow the Yinhe to follow its course right to Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, and then let a third party examine the shipping list and cargo to see whether they contain thiodiglycol and thionylchloride. But the United States is impervious to reason and has put pressure on Dubai so that they did not allow the Yinhe to sail to the port. The United States has also used warships to shadow and interfere with the ship with the result that it could not obtain supplies and ran out of water and oil. Moreover, it demanded the ship sail back to China. The United States did the evil and covered it up simultaneously. If it allows the Yinhe to unload its cargo in the Middle East and then has them inspected by a third party, the U.S. "intelligence" will go bankrupt.

The Yinhe incident is a farce staged by U.S. politicians in an attempt to vilify China. Not happy at the failure to obstruct China from winning as host country for the Olympic Games resulting from recent just criticisms from the world and at home, they fabricated the Yinhe incident. Now that China has solemnly put forward a proposal for the resolution of the issue, the United States should stop obstructing the Yinhe from berthing at

Middle East ports, justly and reasonably resolve the issue, and prevent the matter from worsening.

### **Regulations on Coping With Nuclear Accidents**

OW2108101493 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 2110 GMT 16 Aug 93

[Text] Beijing, 17 August (XINHUA)—Regulations for Contingency Control of Nuclear Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants

#### **Chapter I. General Rules**

Article 1. These regulations are formulated to strengthen control of measures to tackle a nuclear accident at a nuclear power plant and to control and reduce the harm done by such an accident.

Article 2. These regulations apply to the control of measures to tackle a nuclear accident at a nuclear power plant that may emit or has already emitted radioactive substances and may cause or has caused serious radiation problems (hereafter nuclear accident for short).

Article 3. The above control work implements the policy of emphasizing continual alertness, being active and compatible, centralizing command, coordinating vigorously, protecting the masses, and protecting the environment.

#### **Chapter II. Organizations Responsible for Tackling an Emergency and Their Duties**

Article 4. The department designated by the State Council shall be responsible for the control of measures to tackle a nuclear accident anywhere in the country. Its main duties are:

- (1) To draw up a national policy on work to tackle a nuclear accident;
- (2) To conduct centralized coordination among relevant departments of the State Council, the army, and local people's governments for work in tackling a nuclear accident;
- (3) To organize the formulation and implementation of a national contingency plan to meet nuclear accidents, and to examine and approve a contingency plan for nuclear accidents at places outside the area [under the jurisdiction of the nuclear power plant];
- (4) To approve the declaration of state of emergency for places outside the area [under the jurisdiction of the nuclear power plant], and its termination at an appropriate time;
- (5) To make suggestions on taking action to tackle a nuclear accident;
- (6) To examine and approve a nuclear accident bulletin and international circular, and to put forward a plan for requesting international aid.



If necessary, the State Council will lead, organize, and coordinate for the entire country the control of measures to tackle a nuclear accident.

Article 5. The departments designated by the people's governments of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in which nuclear power plants are located shall be responsible for the control of measures to tackle nuclear accidents inside their own administrative regions. Their main duties are:

- (1) To implement the laws, regulations, and policy of the state on tackling a nuclear accident;
- (2) To organize the formulation of a contingency plan for nuclear accidents at places outside the area [under the jurisdiction of the nuclear power plant], and to make proper preparations for tackling a nuclear accident;
- (3) To assume centralized command over corresponding action to tackle a nuclear accident outside the area [under the jurisdiction of the nuclear power plant];
- (4) To organize support for corresponding actions to meet a nuclear accident;
- (5) To circulate, as quickly as possible, a notice on the nuclear accident to neighboring provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.

If necessary, the provincial, autonomous regional, and municipal people's governments will lead, organize, and coordinate control of measures to tackle a nuclear accident inside their own administrative regions.

Article 6. The main duties for a nuclear power plant organization responsible for tackling a nuclear accident are:

- (1) To implement the laws, regulations, and policy of the state on tackling a nuclear accident;
- (2) To draw up a contingency plan for a nuclear accident inside the area [under the jurisdiction of the nuclear power plant], and to make proper preparations to tackle a nuclear accident;
- (3) To determine the extent of the state of emergency, depending on the nuclear accident, and to assume centralized command over their own unit's efforts to tackle a nuclear accident;
- (4) To report an accident speedily to the department at the higher level responsible for the work, the nuclear safety department of the State Council, and the department designated by the people's government at provincial level, and to suggest which other areas outside the area but under the jurisdiction of the nuclear power plant, need to adopt protective measures to meet the emergency;
- (5) To assist and coordinate with the department designated by the people's government at provincial level to work out how to tackle a nuclear accident.

Article 7. A nuclear power plant's department at the higher level responsible for the work shall lead the work of tackling the nuclear accident at the plant.

The nuclear safety department, the environmental protection department, the public health department, and other relevant departments of the State Council shall do a good job in taking appropriate measures to tackle a nuclear accident within their duties.

Article 8. As an important force in work to tackle a nuclear accident, the People's Liberation Army [PLA] should give effective support to actions to meet an emergency caused by a nuclear accident.

### Chapter III. Contingency Preparations

Article 9. Nuclear power plants' nuclear accident contingency units, departments designated by local provincial people's governments, and departments designated by the State Council should draw up in advance a nuclear accident contingency plan tailored to cope with possible nuclear accidents of nuclear power plants.

A nuclear accident contingency plan should include a contingency plan for the area under the nuclear power plant's administration and for areas outside the nuclear power plant-administered area and a state nuclear accident contingency plan. These contingency plans should be consistent with each other and should properly fit into each other.

Article 10. A nuclear accident contingency plan for the area under a nuclear power plant's administration is to be drawn up by the nuclear power plant's nuclear accident contingency unit. After the plan is examined by the department in charge of the unit, it is to be submitted to the State Council Nuclear Safety Department for evaluation and then to a department designated by the State Council for the record.

Article 11. A nuclear accident contingency plan for areas outside the area under a nuclear power plant's administration is to be drawn up under the supervision of a department designated by the people's government of the province where the power plant is located, and then submitted to a department designated by the State Council for examination and approval.

Article 12. A state nuclear accident contingency plan is to be drawn up under the supervision of a department designated by the State Council.

Based on the state nuclear accident contingency plan, concerned State Council departments and the People's Liberation Army headquarters should draw up a supporting nuclear accident contingency plan and submit it to a department designated by the State Council for the record.

Article 13. A nuclear accident contingency plan for the area administered by a nuclear power plant and a contingency plan for areas outside the nuclear power plant-administered area should both include the following details:

- (1) The basic tasks of nuclear accident contingency work;
- (2) Nuclear accident contingency responding organizations and their responsibility;
- (3) The areas covered by the cloud [yan yu 3533 5038] contingency plan zone and by the intake [shi ru 7380 3354] contingency plan zone;
- (4) The level of interference and the inferred [dao chu 1418 0427] interference level;
- (5) A detailed plan for nuclear accident contingency preparations and responses;
- (6) Contingency facilities, equipment, and other materials;
- (7) Matters and measures concerning the coordination of efforts of and the mutual support between a nuclear power plant's nuclear accident contingency unit and the department designated by the local provincial people's government and between the unit and other departments concerned.

Article 14. In selecting a site for the construction of a nuclear power plant and in designing the nuclear power plant, departments concerned should consider the requirements of nuclear accident contingency work.

Newly built nuclear power plants may install fuel only after their nuclear accident contingency plans for the areas under their administration and their contingency plans for areas outside the areas administered by them are approved.

Article 15. The department designated by the State Council, the department designated by the local provincial people's government, and a nuclear power plant's nuclear accident contingency unit should be equipped with necessary contingency facilities and equipment and should have a rapid and reliable intercommunications system.

Nuclear power plants' nuclear accident contingency units and the departments designated by local provincial people's governments should have a radioactivity monitoring system, radioactivity protection equipment and pharmaceuticals, and other necessary materials.

Facilities and equipment for nuclear accident contingency work, communications system, radioactivity monitoring system, radioactivity protection equipment and pharmaceuticals, and other materials should be in good condition.

Article 16. Nuclear power plants should conduct special education among their staff members and workers concerning nuclear safety, radioactivity protection, and nuclear accident contingency measures.

With the assistance of nuclear power plants, departments designated by local provincial people's governments should conduct general education, among residents living around nuclear power plants, in nuclear safety; radioactivity protection; and nuclear accident contingency measures.

Article 17. Nuclear power plants' nuclear accident contingency units and departments designated by local provincial people's governments should provide training for nuclear accident contingency workers.

Article 18. Nuclear power plants' nuclear accident contingency units and departments designated by local provincial people's governments should timely organize nuclear accident contingency exercises of various scales focusing on dealing with accidents of different natures.

Before nuclear power plants are supplied with fuel, the plants' nuclear accident contingency units and departments designated by local provincial people's governments should organize nuclear accident contingency exercises within and outside the areas administered by nuclear power plants.

#### **Chapter IV. The Way To Deal With an Emergency and Emergency Protective Measures**

Article 19. The emergency state of a nuclear accident is classified into the following four degrees:

(1) Emergency standby. When a certain, special condition or external incident that may jeopardize the safety of a nuclear power plant appears, its relevant personnel are placed on alert.

(2) Meeting a plant emergency. When the consequences of an accident will affect only some areas of the nuclear power plant, its personnel will take corresponding emergency measures against the nuclear accident in accordance with the contingency plan for nuclear accident inside the area [under the nuclear power plant's jurisdiction], and notify the organization outside the plant responsible for corresponding actions to meet a nuclear accident emergency.

(3) Meeting an emergency in the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction]. When the consequences of an accident spread to the entire area [under the power plant's jurisdiction], the personnel in the area will take corresponding emergency measures against the nuclear accident and notify the department designated by the provincial people's government so that the organization outside the plant responsible for dealing with a nuclear emergency may take corresponding emergency measures against the nuclear accident.

(4) Meeting an emergency outside the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction]. When the consequences of



an accident spill beyond the boundary of the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction], the contingency plan for a nuclear accident inside and outside the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction] will be implemented.

Article 21. When emergency standby is declared in a nuclear power plant, its organization responsible for meeting a nuclear emergency should report in a timely manner the situation to the department at the higher level responsible for the work and to the State Council Nuclear Safety Department, and, depending on the situation, decide on whether or not a report should also be submitted to the department designated by the provincial people's government. When emission of radioactive substances may occur or has already occurred, the organization should decide in a timely manner on declaring a state of meeting an emergency in the plant or in the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction], and promptly report the situation to the nuclear power plant's department at the higher level responsible for the work, the State Council Nuclear Safety Department, and the department designated by the provincial people's government; when radioactive substances may spread or have already spread to places outside the area under the power plant's jurisdiction, the organization should promptly suggest to the department designated by the provincial people's government on declaring a state of emergency outside the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction] and on taking emergency protective measures.

Upon receipt of a report on an accident from the nuclear power plant's organization responsible for meeting a nuclear emergency, the department designated by the provincial people's government should immediately take appropriate countermeasures and emergency protective measures to deal with the accident, and report in a timely manner the situation to the department designated by the State Council. The decision on declaring the state of emergency for places outside the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction] should be approved by the department designated by the State Council. Under special circumstances, the department designated by the provincial people's government may decide beforehand on declaring a state of emergency for places outside the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction], but it should immediately report to the department designated by the State Council [afterwards].

Article 21. The nuclear power plant's organization responsible for meeting a nuclear emergency and the department designated by the provincial people's government should do a good job of predicting and assessing the consequences of a nuclear accident as well as monitoring radioactivity in the surrounding areas to provide a basis for deciding on how to deal with a nuclear accident and for taking emergency protective measures.

Article 22. The department designated by the provincial people's government should take such emergency protective measures as choosing shelters; taking iodine stabilizers; controlling passageways, food, and water sources;

evacuating and moving people out of affected areas; and getting rid of pollution at affected areas at an appropriate time.

Article 23. The department designated by the provincial people's government should let local people know in a timely manner the necessary information in the process of taking emergency measures to deal with a nuclear accident.

Article 24. On the site of a nuclear accident, all organizations responsible for emergency measures against a nuclear accident should implement effective supervision over radioactive dosage. All their personnel and other personnel should conduct activities under the supervision and guidance of radiation protection personnel on the site of a nuclear accident to avoid excessive exposure dosage as best they can.

Article 25. The nuclear power plant's organization responsible for meeting a nuclear emergency and the department designated by the provincial people's government should do a good job of having irradiation personnel rescue, cleanse, transfer, and give medical treatment [to victims] on the site of a nuclear accident.

Article 26. When a state of emergency is declared for places outside the area [under the power plant's jurisdiction] during a nuclear accident, the department designated by the State Council should dispatch timely in a timely manner personnel and have them rush to the site to guide corresponding emergency actions. If necessary, they should suggest the dispatch of reinforcements to the rescue.

Article 27. The imposition of a regional blockade may be necessitated by a nuclear emergency. Regional blockade in an administrative province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the central government's jurisdiction may be imposed by the people's government of the province, autonomous region, or municipality; and a transprovincial, regional, or municipal blockade as well as a regional blockade that will disrupt the main lines of communication or that will blockade the territory shall be determined by the State Council.

The lifting of a regional blockade shall be declared by the organ that imposed it.

Article 28. Information about nuclear accidents shall be released by a unit authorized by the State Council.

#### **Chapter V. The Termination of the State of Emergency and Recovery Measures**

Article 29. The termination of the state of emergency outside the nuclear plant shall be declared by a department designated by a provincial-level people's government on the basis of the proposal jointly submitted by departments designated by a provincial-level people's government and the nuclear plant's organ for controlling

nuclear accidents and after the proposal has been reported to the authorities designated by the State Council for approval.

Article 30. Departments designated by a provincial-level people's government shall take effective recovery measures in accordance with the radioactivity level in the affected areas.

Article 31. After the state of emergency caused by the nuclear accident has been terminated, the nuclear power plant's organ for controlling nuclear emergencies shall submit a detailed report about the accident to departments designated by the State Council, authorities in charge of the nuclear power plant, State Council authorities in charge of nuclear safety, and departments designated by a provincial-level people's government; and departments designated by the provincial-level people's government shall submit a conclusive report to departments designated by the State Council about the emergency measures taken outside the nuclear power plant.

Article 32. When major equipment cannot measure up to the state's standards for ensuring safety as a result of a nuclear accident, the nuclear plant's plan for resuming operations shall be examined and approved according to relevant state regulations.

#### Chapter VI. Security of Capital and Equipment

Article 33. While preparing for controlling nuclear emergencies, relevant departments of the State Council, military units, local people's governments, and nuclear power plants themselves shall take full advantage of their available organs, personnel, facilities, and equipment. They shall strive to make more efficient use of capital and equipment for controlling nuclear accidents. Their preparedness for nuclear accidents shall also be integrated with development plans of localities and nuclear power plants. All relevant units shall also render support.

Article 34. The nuclear power plant shall bear the funds for controlling the nuclear emergency in the power plant. The funds shall be incorporated with the plant's investment budget and operating cost.

Funds for controlling an emergency outside the plant shall be provided by the nuclear power plant and the local people's government. The amount of funds shall be determined by departments designated by the State Council and relevant departments. Funds provided by the nuclear power plant shall be paid on the basis of the nuclear power plant's capacity before it is commissioned to operate, and on the basis of a certain percentage of its power output after it is commissioned to operate. After an overall balance has been made by the State Council's planning department, the fund shall be used for the locality's preparedness against nuclear accidents outside the plant. Additional money that is needed shall be provided by the local people's government. Specific measures shall be prescribed by departments designated by the State Council along with State Council planning and financial departments.

Funds which relevant departments of the State Council and military units need for preparedness against nuclear emergencies shall be arranged by taking full advantage of their available resources and on the basis of their responsibilities and assignments during the nuclear emergency. Deficits shall be reported to higher authorities according to their respective plans and financial avenues.

Article 35. State and local materials supply departments and other relevant departments should ensure the supply of equipment and other materials necessary for dealing with nuclear emergencies.

Article 36. To support any nuclear power plant in dealing with a nuclear emergency, the administrative organs taking the supportive action are empowered to requisition the emergency equipment and materials earmarked for other than nuclear emergencies.

The equipment and materials being requisitioned should be registered and returned after use; units requisitioning them should compensate for damage caused to the equipment or materials.

#### Chapter VII. Rewards and Penalties

Article 37. Units and individuals with one of the following deeds in the nuclear emergency work should be commended or awarded by competent authorities or their units:

- 1) Those who complete their supportive missions during a nuclear emergency;
- 2) Those who make outstanding achievements in safeguarding public security and the property of the state, collectives, and citizens;
- 3) Those who submit significant suggestions on the preparations and support for dealing with nuclear emergencies and whose suggestions are carried out with marked effect;
- 4) Those who make correct and timely radioactivity detection and weather forecasts and thus reduce losses; and
- 5) Those who make other special contributions.

Article 38. Responsible people performing any of the following deeds should receive administrative punishment from their units or from higher authorities according to the seriousness of the case and the consequences, deeds constituting public order violations should be punished by public security organs according to the regulations governing offenses against public order, and deeds constituting crimes should be investigated by judicial organs to determine the criminal responsibility:

- 1) If they do not draw up emergency plans for nuclear accidents according to stipulations and refuse to prepare for nuclear emergencies;
- 2) If a nuclear accident is caused by their neglect of duty;

3) If they do not report or circulate a notice on the real conditions of a nuclear accident according to stipulations;

4) If they refuse to execute the emergency plans for nuclear accidents, disobey orders and commands, or sneak away at a critical juncture during a nuclear emergency;

5) If they steal, misappropriate, or embezzle funds or materials earmarked for nuclear emergencies;

6) If they obstruct nuclear emergency personnel from performing official duties according to law, or engage in sabotage;

7) If they spread rumors and disturb social order; or

8) Any other deeds detrimental to the work of dealing with nuclear emergencies.

#### Chapter VIII. Supplementary Provisions

Article 39. Definitions of terms used in these regulations:

1) To deal with nuclear emergencies means emergency actions which are different from the normal order and normal work procedures and are taken for the purpose of bringing under control or alleviating a nuclear accident or reducing its ill effects;

2) Plant area denotes the area under the nuclear power plant's jurisdiction;

3) Contingency plan area denotes the area surrounding a nuclear power plant, for which there are nuclear accident contingency plans, nuclear accident emergency measures, and emergency protective measures;

4) The radioactive cloud contingency plan zone denotes a contingency plan zone for dealing with irradiation caused by radioactive clouds;

5) The intake contingency plan zone denotes a contingency plan zone for dealing with irradiation caused by intake of radioactive- contaminated water or food;

6) The level of interference means the predetermined level of dosage of protective measures to be taken for the public under an extraordinary situation;

7) The inferred interference level means the density or level of radioactive substance in the environmental media inferred from the level of interference;

8) Emergency protective measures means the protective measures for controlling the dosage for working personnel and the public during a nuclear accident; and

9) Important things for nuclear safety means anything which is of great significance to nuclear safety, such as buildings, structures, systems, components, or installations.

Article 40. A nuclear accident at nuclear facilities other than a nuclear power plant may be handled according to the specific situation and in light of relevant stipulations in these regulations.

Article 41. Any nuclear accident in which released radioactive substances is likely to cross or has already crossed the national boundary should, in addition to these regulations, be handled according to international treaties of which the PRC is a signatory or participant, with the exception of those clauses on which the PRC has expressed reservations.

Article 42. These regulations come into force upon promulgation.

## North Korea

### DPRK Shipped Scuds to Syria on Russian Airplanes

SK1508232093 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2200 GMT 15 Aug 93

[Text] North Korea exported Scud missiles to Syria via Russian airlines on 8 August, said Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In a fund-raising meeting of Jewish-Americans held in Jerusalem yesterday, Prime Minister Rabin said that Russian airplanes freighted Scud-C missiles from North Korea to Damascus, and perhaps to Iran as well, on 8 August, two days after U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher ended his visit to the Middle East.

### IAEA Negotiation Team To Go To North Korea

#### North Apparently Realizes It Must Proceed With Talks

SK1908092193 Seoul YONHAP in English 0845 GMT  
19 Aug 93

[YONHAP "News Analysis" by Chang Yong-sop: "N.K. Appears To Realize It Can't Drag Out Nuke Issue Any Longer"]

[Text] Washington, Aug. 18 (YONHAP)—North Korea appears to have realized that it can no longer drag its nuclear issue on without fulfilling the agreements it reached in the second round of its talks with the United States in Geneva on July 19.

Pyongyang has sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressing its willingness to accept an IAEA delegation to Pyongyang for talks on resuming nuclear inspections after seven months of refusal, IAEA spokesman David Kyd said in Vienna on Wednesday.

In order to make the best use of its so-called "nuclear card," North Korea could have tried to delay the resumption of talks with the IAEA on nuclear inspection as long as possible.

Judging by recent international developments, however, it must have realized it could no longer do so.

First of all, North Korea promised the United States at their Geneva talks that it would start negotiating with the IAEA on the inspection of its nuclear facilities at an early date.

The United States has made it clear it will not hold the third round of high-level talks with Pyongyang unless North Korea begins negotiating with the IAEA as well as with South Korea.

On top of it, the IAEA is scheduled to convene a Board of Governors meeting in mid-September, to be followed by the United Nations' General Assembly session.

If North Korea had continued to delay its talks with the IAEA, international suspicion on North Korea's nuclear arms development would surely have become one of the main subjects of discussion at those meetings.

Moreover, the United States dangled another tempting carrot when it promised Pyongyang in Geneva that it would be willing to hold the third round of talks on topics including improvement of bilateral relations around Sept. 20, if there was progress on the nuclear issue.

Pyongyang, which dearly wants to improve ties with Washington, is pressed for time.

Following the Geneva meeting, North Korea had appeared to be trying to make the third round of talks an accomplished fact.

But North Korea has obviously come to feel the United States is firm in its resolution that there will not be any further meeting unless it negotiates with the IAEA and South Korea first.

Pyongyang had no other choice but to agree to meetings with the IAEA and Seoul.

In this context, there is a strong possibility that North Korea will respond positively to Seoul's proposal to resume inter-Korean dialogue.

Many analysts find it difficult to expect North Korea and the IAEA to reach any kind of agreement on IAEA inspection of the two suspected sites in the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

The two sides are standing far apart as North Korea is expected to bring up the "impartiality" of the U.N. specialized agency and the IAEA will press Pyongyang to implement the nuclear safeguards agreements that it has signed with the IAEA.

In addition, North Korea could take up the question of U.S. assistance in replacing its graphite-type nuclear reactors with those moderated by light water, further complicating the issue.

The United States has said it would study the possibility of extending assistance in reactor replacement only after suspicion over North Korea's nuclear arms development is dispelled.

North Korea, on the other hand, has indicated it plans to link the reactor question with IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Pyongyang has said that if Washington fails to provide it with assistance for replacing its reactors or tries to delay keeping the promise, it will have to take it that the United States is not interested in resolving the nuclear issue.

Because of the North Korean attitude, most experts and observers in both the United States and the IAEA are trying to attach a meaning to North Korea's finally



agreeing to sit down for talks with the IAEA. Nothing more can be expected at this time, they say.

Many diplomats in Washington, while positively evaluating the North Korean proposal to talk as "a step forward," are expressing concern that Pyongyang might still be trying to use its "nuclear card" to wring as many concessions as possible from the United States including the permanent scrapping of the joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise "Team Spirit" and improvement in its relations with the United States.

In short, there will be no breakthrough in the nuclear impasse as long as North Korea refuses to show sincere efforts to resolve the question peacefully.

#### Late August Visit Scheduled

SK1908133693 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network  
in Korean 1225 GMT 19 Aug 93

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today decided to dispatch a four- or five-member negotiation team to Pyongyang at the end of this month to discuss the nuclear accords with North Korea. This dispatch is in response to a request by the North Korean side.

The North Korean request for resumption of negotiations was one of the preconditions for third-phase talks between the United States and North Korea.

Correspondent Cha Man-sun reports from Vienna.

[Begin Cha recording] Negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea over the North Korean nuclear issue are expected to take place for three days from around 30 August. However, a stumbling block will likely be laid in the course of negotiations.

David Kyd, director of the public information department of the IAEA, today notified North Korea that the IAEA will send a four- or five-member negotiation team to Pyongyang at the end of this month in accordance with the North Korean proposal. He said that the forthcoming negotiations will last for three days.

Director David Kyd said that the IAEA made this decision after carefully reviewing the North Korean proposal for sending a negotiation team to Pyongyang to discuss the nuclear accord issue. He stated that it is difficult at present to predict what the result of the talks will be.

The major agenda items of the forthcoming negotiations are expected to be the special inspection issue and issues of examining the 5-point differences that were disclosed as a result of inspection. They will also likely discuss sincere implementation of an ad hoc inspection [imsi sachal].

In particular, it was learned that the IAEA's negotiation team will consist of inspection experts whose level is higher than bureau directors who are policy-related decision makers.

North Korea's resumption of negotiations with the IAEA is intended to comply with one of preconditions for third-phase talks with the United States for improving relations. However, some people pointed out that this is a strategy designed to avoid in advance the international pressure that will likely increase with the approach of the IAEA's Congress in late September and the UN General Assembly. [end recording]

#### IAEA Accepts North Korean Bid To Hold Talks in Pyongyang

SK2108001793 Seoul YONHAP in English 0003 GMT  
21 Aug 93

[Text] Paris, Aug. 20 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided Friday to accept a North Korean proposal to hold negotiations in Pyongyang on the implementation by North Korea of the nuclear safeguards agreement.

An IAEA official said Friday that the agency has sent a letter to Pyongyang Thursday, accepting the North Korean invitation made Thursday by Choe Hak-kun, minister of Atomic Energy Industry.

North Korea told the IAEA that it was prepared to receive an IAEA delegation to Pyongyang to discuss pending issues including special inspection of its nuclear facilities, the official said.

The IAEA has decided to form a five-member delegation led by the deputy director of the nuclear safety management bureau of the agency. The IAEA will let North Korea fix the date of the proposed negotiations, the official said.

After the first round of negotiations in Pyongyang, a second round would be held in Vienna if necessary, the official said, requesting anonymity.

As a result, the negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea are expected to resume nearly half a year after they have been suspended in February over the issue involving the two unreported and suspected sites in the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex.

But one diplomatic source in Vienna predicted that even though North Korea proposed the resumption of negotiations, it would not agree to special IAEA inspection on the two suspected sites.

Nevertheless, a planned dispatch of an IAEA delegation to North Korea is a step forward toward the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, he added.

The North Korean proposal to the IAEA for talks was part of agreement Pyongyang has reached with the United States in their high-level talks in Geneva on July 19.



### PRC Envoy on DPRK Nuclear Issue, Chinese Leaders

SK2108011693 Seoul YONHAP in English 0058 GMT  
21 Aug 93

[Text] Seoul, Aug. 21 (YONHAP)—International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors are expected to enter North Korea within days, Chinese Ambassador to Seoul Zhang Tingyan said Saturday.

"The IAEA team is waiting for visas to enter Pyongyang," Zhang told YONHAP in an interview commemorating the first anniversary of Seoul-Beijing diplomatic normalization 24 Aug. adding that he was optimistic about ongoing negotiations on North Korea's nuclear issue.

"North Korea and the United States already met twice and are preparing for a third round. Prospects are quite bright," Zhang said.

The fledgling relations between the former war foes were tested over North Korea's nuclear problem as it was put to a U.N. Security Council resolution. After months of tugging, China abstained from the May 11 vote on the resolution demanding Pyongyang stay in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and comply with IAEA safeguards accord.

"Beijing's policy toward the Korean peninsula has consistently targeted stability and easing of tension. We put in a lot of effort for this goal and will continue with constructive efforts in the future," he said.

China took interest in North Korea's nuclear problem from the start and held negotiations with South Korea and other involved nations.

"It is our wish to see lessening of tension, without any incidents or accidents," he said.

Looking back over the past year in Seoul-Beijing ties, the envoy called the buildup of political trust the major harvest.

"The relations were beneficial to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The two countries built political trust through dialogue and negotiations and cooperated well at international level," he said.

Inter-Korean problems should be left up to Seoul and Pyongyang to solve, he told YONHAP.

"We hope to see South and North Korea improve their relations through direct dialogue," the ambassador said.

On widespread rumors that paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's health is failing, Zhang said that such reports were "completely groundless."

The chances of Chinese President Jiang Zemin visiting Seoul this year are nil, he said, because a tight domestic schedule prevents him from going on any overseas trip.

Beijing will attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November if the representation issue is agreed on by the three Chinas—Hong Kong, Taiwan and China.

No decision has been made on who will attend the summit for Beijing, said Zhang.

### U.S. Reportedly Says Nuclear Assistance to DPRK Impossible

SK1708044093 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
17 Aug 93 p 10

[Article by reporter Pak Tu-sik]

[Text] It was learned on 16 August that the U.S. Government informed the ROK side of its position that the support for the light-water moderated reactor which North Korea requested is "impossible as a matter of fact." Then, the U.S. Government pointed out pertinent domestic U.S. laws and regulations that prohibit such support.

The U.S. Government told Chang Chae-yong, director-general of the Bureau of North American Affairs who recently visited the United States to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue, that "U.S. domestic laws prohibit nuclear cooperation with countries that do not fulfill their nuclear safety missions in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency."

Diplomatic sources revealed that even if the U.S. side enters the stage of reviewing the support of light-water moderated reactors to North Korea, the U.S. Government would not shoulder the expenses for this.

### DPRK-Israeli Talks Source of Concern

#### Foreign Ministry 'Kept In the Dark' on DPRK-Israeli Talks

SK1708024093 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
17 Aug 93 p 2

[From the "Press Pocket" column: "In the Dark." For further information, see article under Israel in this Proliferation Issues report.]

[Text] The government appears to have been kept in the dark about recent Pyongyang-Jerusalem contacts with no information coming from Israel or any other source, including the United States.

A ranking Foreign Ministry official said yesterday he had no information about wire reports that senior officials from both countries met to discuss establishment of diplomatic ties in China early this month.

He recalled a promise from the Israeli side that it would consult with Seoul prior to contact with North Korea, saying, "We were not informed of the recent contact by Israel."

But he said that Israel has been desperate to block the sales of missiles by North Korea to Iran and other Middle East nations as North Korean missiles are a life-or-death issue for it.

Wire reports said that Israel had urged North Korea to call off sales while North Korea was reportedly asking for \$1 billion in economic assistance including the purchase of a gold mine.

At a June meeting in Beijing, the two countries were reported to have produced no tangible results. North Korea, in isolation from the world because of its nuclear development program, is eager to earn hard currency to buy oil.

The ministry official said that the diplomatic normalization between Israel and North Korea would not come easily due to wide differences on the arms sales issue. North Korea has insisted that it had not sold nor would sell missiles to Arab nations. It has been confirmed that North Korea has successfully test-fired Nodong-1 missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers over the East Sea.

#### **Foreign Ministry Asks Israel Not To Develop Ties With DPRK**

SK1708022493 Seoul YONHAP in English 0213 GMT 17 Aug 93

[Text] Seoul, Aug. 17 (YONHAP)—Seoul has again asked Israel to refrain from seeking an improvement in relations with North Korea until the nuclear situation is fully cleared up, Foreign Ministry officials said Tuesday.

The ministry called in Israeli Ambassador Asher Na'im on Monday morning for an explanation of news reports that Israel and North Korea have held contact in Beijing, officials said.

Naim later confirmed that the deputy chiefs of mission of the two countries did meet Aug. 11 in Beijing, but told the ministry that they did not discuss diplomatic normalization, according to the officials.

Isolated and cash-strapped, Pyongyang accosted Jerusalem last October with a proposal to sell a gold mine for 1 billion U.S. dollars, the money it said it would lose if it stopped selling arms to Israel's enemies in the Middle East.

Ministry officials said Israel is unlikely to be able to meet the demand for economic assistance, since the demanded amount was about one-third of what it gets in aid from the United States.

They said Israel's decision to continue negotiations with North Korea was probably spurred by Pyongyang's recent test firing of its upgraded Scud-C missile that can strike as far as 1,000 kilometers and intelligence information that the missiles were recently delivered to Syria.

"Seoul's position is firm. We oppose diplomatic normalization between Israel and North Korea at this particular

time when the international community is actively coordinating measures to clear Pyongyang's nuclear suspicion," said an official.

#### **South Korea**

#### **Newspaper Berates Government 'Inconsistency' on DPRK Issue**

SK2108083593 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 21 Aug 93 p 2

[Editorial: "There Are Many Problems in the Policy for North-South Dialogue"]

[Text] We hear that North Korea will resume discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Pyongyang early next month. At the same time, the government decided, at the unification-related ministers' meeting 18 August, to push ahead with North-South dialogue from a positive stance if North Korea resumes negotiations with the IAEA for nuclear inspections. This seems to be a sign that the cross bar that has locked the North-South dialogue for quite some time is now being lifted. However, the North Korean attitude remains rigid, leading us to doubt whether North-South dialogue will begin very soon. On 4 August, the South Korean side proposed to the North Korean side to hold a joint nuclear control committee meeting, but the North side virtually rejected it, criticizing the South's attitude for dialogue. The North Korean side simply reiterated the need for the exchange of special envoys. The North Korean side put forward three conditions, namely, suspension of the Team Spirit exercise and the Ulchi Focus Lens exercise, abandoning of the cooperative system among the ROK, the United States, and Japan in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, and allowing the pan-national rally to be held, as prerequisites for the resumption of dialogue. The pan-national rally is no longer a precondition because 15 August, the day set for the rally, has now passed. The only remaining precondition, if any, is the Ulchi exercise.

The Team Spirit exercise will depend upon the situation on the Korean peninsula next year; the North Korean assertion against the cooperative system among the ROK, the United States, and Japan is largely motivated for political offensive in view of the ongoing North Korea-U.S. negotiations, posing no significant stumbling block to the resumption of North-South dialogue. Therefore, many observers are of the opinion that the atmosphere for North-South dialogue will be ripe in September.

For the promotion of North-South dialogue, and further, for the alleviation of tension on the Korean peninsula, we would like to urge the government to straighten out its attitude. First, we urge the government to maintain consistency in its policy for North-South dialogue. We hope that the government will refrain from the inconsistency of putting forward tougher preconditions for

North-South dialogue, then loosening the preconditions, then doing away with the preconditions, and then adding to the preconditions.

The government provoked North Korea, saying that the South cannot engage in dialogue unless the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved and that the South cannot shake hands with the North as long as the North has nuclear weapons. The South's authorities also said that they cannot engage in dialogue with the North unless the deadline for the nuclear inspection is set. When North Korea rejected the proposal for the resumption of the joint nuclear control committee, a high-ranking government official said, "Now there is only a whipping for them." All this contributed to damaging the credibility of the government. Second, not trusting the North Korea-U.S. talks and the visit to Yongbyon by the IAEA inspection team, the government complained about them, revealing its narrow-mindedness. While the government downgraded the IAEA's one-week ad hoc inspection beginning 3 August describing it as "for technical purposes," the United States described it as "considerable success" from the standpoint of ensuring continuity of safety measures. In the meantime, another government official, UN Ambassador Yu Chong-ha, in an interview upon returning home, said that the North Korea-U.S. talks have so far received generally positive responses from the major states, adding that the North Korea-U.S. talks have been progressing in a right direction. He confirmed that North Korea has not produced plutonium, which is the material used to produce nuclear weapons, since it started talks with the United States last June.

Next, we cannot understand why the government should so frequently mention the triangular cooperative system among the ROK, the United States, and Japan in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Why should the government mention cooperation with Japan, to which North Korea shows such an allergic reaction? This is the reason why the government is criticized not being independent. Finally, what is the use of the government's frequent remarks that sanctions are inevitable if the North does such and such. We hope that the government will straighten out its attitude with a deep breath. We urge the government to act more prudently with proper coordination among the government departments.

#### **Gallucci's Upcoming Seoul Visit Reported**

SK2108031593 Seoul YONHAP in English 0255 GMT  
21 Aug 93

[Text] Seoul, Aug. 21 (YONHAP)—Robert Gallucci, chief U.S. delegate to the nuclear talks with North Korea, will come to Seoul next week for bilateral consultations before the next round of Washington-Pyongyang meetings, an official said Saturday.

Gallucci is set to meet with Unification Minister Han Wan-sang and Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu to set the direction of the talks and discuss the timing and method of inter-Korean contact, the official said.

The visit by Gallucci, assistant secretary of state, who represented Washington at the past two rounds of talks with North Korea, coincides with the imminent entry of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection team to Pyongyang to discuss access to two key suspected nuclear sites.

The IAEA team is said to be waiting for visas from Pyongyang and likely to enter within days.

Seoul and Washington are most likely to reconfirm that North Korea has to talk with both the IAEA and with South Korea before the United States agrees to further meetings with Pyongyang.

Seoul had said it will not insist on "special inspection" per se on the two suspected North Korean sites as long as the IAEA is guaranteed the same results as a special inspection through other means.

The official said the government will coordinate views on this point during Gallucci's visit.

Coordination will also be on the timing and method of inter-Korean contact, the official said.

North Korea reacted negatively to South Korea's recent proposal to reactivate the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

#### **Russia Proposes Aircraft, Missiles as Loan Interest Payment**

SK2308081193 Seoul YONHAP in English 0751 GMT  
23 Aug 93

[Text] Taejeon, South Korea, Aug. 23 (YONHAP)—Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Shokhin said Monday that he would propose a new principle to pay the interest on loans from South Korea that Russia has been unable to repay.

The new principle is not just delaying payment, but changing the terms of servicing, he told a news conference at the Russian pavilion at the Taejeon Expo.

Russia agreed on the way to pay interest with the Paris Club, a group of creditors from 19 Western countries, and hopes Korea will agree on the similar terms. The Paris Club accord prohibits other nations from granting Moscow better terms, he said.

He suggested that the problem of paying interest will be solved by Seoul's accepting fighter planes and missiles in lieu of cash.

## Bulgaria

### Kozloduy Nuclear Plant Undergoing Maintenance

*AU1908144193 Sofia BTA in English 1255 GMT  
19 Aug 93*

[Text] Kozloduy, August 19 (BTA)—Three of the six generating units at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant are in operation—Units 2, 3 and 5, whose combined capacity is 1,240 megawatts, the N-plant's press service reported. The other three units are under repair, aimed to increase the reliability of equipment and improve their nuclear and operational safety.

The 440-megawatt Unit 4 will be put into operation early in September. Unit 1, undergoing a two-year-long reconstruction to bring it in line with the international standards of nuclear and operational safety, is expected to start operating at the end of October. Specialists from the International Association of Nuclear Operators, Siemens and Electricite de France have been enrolled for the implementation of the project. Reloading the reactor of the 1000-megawatt Unit 6, in the meantime the operators will remove some defects established during the trial operation of the unit. Unit 6 will be ready at the end of November. The respective authorities are expected to clear it for regular operation by the end of this year.

## Yugoslavia

### Air Force Plans Production of G-5 Aircraft

*AU1108164893 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian  
6 Aug 93 p 6*

[Miroslav Lazanski article: "'Super Galeb Is Becoming a Bird of Prey'"]

[Text] The recent statement by Colonel General Bozidar Stevanovic, commander of the Air Force and Air

Defense, on the "need to continue production of fighter airplanes and create conditions for the modernization of the renowned G-4 aircraft, that is, the production of a new aircraft, the G-5," has clearly aroused great interest in the public. The fact is that the Yugoslav aviation industry has a long tradition of manufacturing airplanes, ranging from those produced shortly before World War II, to the post-war jets and propeller aircraft, some of which were highly praised at international air exhibitions in Burze [name as transliterated] and Farnborough. So, what preconditions are needed to modernize the G-4 and eventually turn it into a new aircraft, the G-5?

In the Utva plant in Smederevo there are presently two prototypes of the improved version of the G-4M "Super Galeb," that have been transferred there from former aircraft manufacturer Soko, in Mostar. These two "Super Galebs" should see significant improvements: increased precision in navigation and firing, a higher degree of integration of the self-guided air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, greater carrying capacity of and more varied weapons [ubojita sredstva], modernized electric and electronic equipment, improvements in the quality of the longitudinal command position [uzdužno komandno kolo], improvements in the reliability of the power plant [pogonska grupa] in freezing conditions, improvements in cockpit ergonomics, and improvements in the level of combat effectiveness of the plane.

Improvements in navigational precision can be achieved by incorporating a modern domestically-produced electronic targeting system, which would be better than a similar system used in French Mirages. With the integration of missiles, the new G-4M is becoming considerably more efficient in anti-helicopter scrambles; against transportation, patrol, and reconnaissance planes; and in performing defense duties. In the new version, the new Galeb will have seven lines of adjustments for its deadly load [ubojni teret], which could weigh up to 1,950 kg. This is quite sufficient for this type of aircraft.



## Argentina

### Minister Admits 'U.S. Pressure' To Suspend Condor-2 Project

PY0708024993 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS

ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1807 GMT 6 Aug 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 6 Aug (NA)—Defense Minister Oscar Camilion today admitted that "it is absolutely correct" that there had been U.S. pressure on Argentina to suspend the Condor-2 project. He explained, however, that the final decision was made unilaterally by the Argentine executive branch.

Regarding the former head of the Condor-2 project, Commodore Miguel Guerrero, he confirmed that "he has been granted leave because he was entitled to it." He added: "The fact that the project had been suspended may have inspired this position."

Camilion denied "unrest" among military as a result of the low salaries. He admitted, however, that "there is concern" over the military budget "because the small amount of resources placed at the disposal of the military sector make it difficult to meet some of the duties attributed to them by the laws."

Camilion made these comments to the Mexican television network "Eco." On the occasion he repeated that the Condor-2 project "has been entirely suspended" and admitted that there has been U.S. pressure "for its suspension."

Camilion pointed out: "There is no doubt about it." He added: "It was not only the United States that wanted the project to be suspended. The UN Security Council, which is hostile to the proliferation of this sort of weapon, also wanted this."

Camilion said that Argentina believes that "any sort of project linked to massive destruction weapons is politically impossible and morally unacceptable." He said that the Condor-2 project "used up large amounts of resources that could have been allocated to other priorities" and that as a result, "it has been entirely suspended."

He explained that although the United States was interested in the project's suspension, "the Argentine decision was unilateral because our country is clearly conscious that this sort of initiative can place us in a position that can be internationally misunderstood and, therefore, not favor us."

He said: "We do not manufacture nuclear and chemical weapons because we do not want to, and because we believe that by doing so we would be violating the basic rules of international coexistence." He added: "We will not manufacture bacteriological weapons because we deem them immoral" and "not because international rules forbid it."

He pointed out: "The best way of ensuring peace is to convince the largest number of countries possible to give up manufacturing this sort of product."

Camilion then confirmed that the Falda del Carmen plant in Cordoba Province, where the Condor-2 manufacturing facilities were installed, "will be recycled" because it has "valuable components." He added, however, that the Falda del Carmen facilities "are no longer part of the Defense Ministry, and are now administered by the National Commission for Atomic Energy."

Camilion said he "has hopes" for the "Pampa 2000" plane bidding called for by the U.S. Department of State. He said the plane is a "serious competitor" in view of "its quality" and that "this allows us to hope for successful sales of this Argentine plane." He pointed out that it "can be used as an offensive weapon and that, according to the international community criterion, it is legal and convenient."

Camilion said that Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo "will allocate all resources possible to the defense area." He said that there are two criteria to allocate funds to this area: "One is the need to ensure a minimum national security, and the other the need not to hinder the economic policy." He added that the economy minister "looks after his accounting, and this is reasonable."

He remembered that some time ago there were "severe cutbacks in defense area expenditures because the economic recovery of Argentina and the stabilization policy called for them." "The time has come for changing some things in this sector. This is precisely where the Armed and Security Forces' concern lies," he remarked.

With regard to the possible participation of an Argentine contingent in UN peacekeeping forces, Camilion said that "it is professionally advisable, financially possible, and politically desirable because it gives prestige to the country."

Concerning the probe into alleged human rights violations during the Malvinas war, Camilion pointed out that "we want to get to the bottom of the issue, rather than filing charges."

To conclude, the defense minister asserted that it is not a "failure" to have received only a few charges [of human rights violations] because "our objective is to find the truth."



## India

### Russian Engine Deal Topic of Discussion

#### Prime Minister Views Russian Engine Deal, Hopes for Self-Reliance

BK1808093093 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 0830 GMT 18 Aug 93

[Text] The prime minister today reiterated India's commitment to achieving self-reliance in high technology, particularly in areas like space having a major bearing on our economic and social development. He was replying to the calling-attention motion moved by Mr. N.A. Balram, CPI [Communist Party of India], and 50 others in the Rajya Sabha on the situation arising out of the scrapping of the cryogenic rocket engine deal by Russia.

Mr. Narasimha Rao said our space engineers have been working to develop our own design on the cryogenic engine. He said though Russia has expressed its inability to fulfill its obligation the Indian ambassador in Moscow, it has however expressed its readiness to hold further consultations with India in the matter. [sentence as heard] He assured the members that if the agreement cannot be implemented, New Delhi is confident of our space scientists and engineers to be able to develop our own technologies. Outlining the circumstances forcing Russia to withdraw from the agreement, he said in May last year USA had imposed embargo on ISRO [Indian Space Research Organization] and Glavkosmos for two years, saying that the agreement violates the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]. The prime minister said both India and Russia had consistently pointed out that the agreement of 1991 does not come under the purview of the MTCR since the intended use of the cryogenic technology was only for peaceful purposes.

Soon after Mr. Balram initiated the discussion, the prime minister intervened and clarified that the contract is not off at this stage, as Russia has only communicated through a non-paper [as heard], which is not a final official communication. He said it is untimely to assume that the agreement does not exist. Making another intervention, the prime minister observed that it is because of the government's efforts that the Russian president had reiterated their commitment to supply the cryogenic engines during his visit in January this year.

Mr. Balram said the issue involves not only Indo-Russian relations but also Indo-U.S. ties. Appreciating the government's stand, he wanted to know why the United States was intervening and pressuring against transfer of technology to India. He demanded a general discussion on the changed international situation, as he felt there is a need for change in India's foreign policy.

An AIADMK [All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam] member, criticizing the U.S. interfering in the internal affairs of our country, observed that the government is not reacting adequately.

A BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] member said that the interference by U.S. is because of the fear that India will be developing satellite launch capability to compete in the international market. The debate is continuing.

#### U.S. Pursuing Two-Track Policy on India

BK0708101993 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES  
in English 27 Jul 93 p 11

[By S. Nihal Singh]

[Text] A host of testimonies presented to the U.S. Congress, Mr. John Malott's bluntspeaking visit to India, and the successful American effort to force Russia to annul the rocket deal point to the Clinton administration's two-track policy towards India. It is supportive of Indian economic reform policies and helpful with loans from international institutions. On the other track, it will continue to pursue relentlessly its agenda to force New Delhi to follow its non-proliferation goals and use human rights as a lever to try to get India to conform to American strategic and political objectives.

Contrary to our experience of the Carter presidency, India still subscribes to the myth of U.S. Democratic administrations being more empathetic with India. The Clinton administration is showing yet again that this is not so, and to the extent Washington is giving salience to non-proliferation and human rights issues, it spells trouble for the Indo-American relationship.

A major new element in the situation is that the Clinton administration is shaping its policies towards India and the world in the post-Cold War era at a time the President has still to stabilise himself politically at home and the reach of American power has never been wider and less challenged. The almost universal belief that American bombing of targets in Baghdad as a reprisal for Iraq's alleged complicity in a plot to murder the former President, Mr. George Bush, was largely motivated by the need to revise Mr. Clinton's low poll ratings points to the temptation of using foreign adventures for domestic purposes.

The United States sees itself as being given a unique opportunity to refashion the world according to its desire and interests even as it realises that its supremacy will not last forever. As far as India and the region are concerned, it has propelled Washington to try to rescue the failed policy of equating India with Pakistan on the assumption that both countries can be effectively pressured because there is no countervailing force and the nonalignment movement is as good as dead.

Kashmir occupies a central place in this strategy because it is a flashpoint in relations between India and Pakistan. The situation on the ground in the State and the Valley's alienation from New Delhi have helped Washington to shift its position. Nevertheless, there is a political motive in the Clinton administration distancing itself from the Simla agreement and pleading for an Indo-Pakistani

agreement taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiris. This stance flows from Washington's desire to follow an "even-handed" policy towards the subcontinental adversaries.

Americans will continue to mount pressure on India to subscribe to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in substance, if not in form, and have overruled Indian objections to a regional nonproliferation arrangement. They suggest that New Delhi's concerns on China and Kazakhstan can best be met through a five-power meeting. Washington has refused to define China's role and status in such a meeting although it is an acknowledged supplier of nuclear material and missiles to Pakistan.

While the United States is not willing to address the question of Israel's nuclear arsenal, it believes it can tame India and Pakistan. Washington must show indulgence to China because it is a nuclear weapon power, offers a vast market and is a strategic factor in U.S. Pacific policies. American anti-Chinese rhetoric therefore dissolves into granting of the most favoured nation treatment in trade as candidate Clinton readjusts his sights to the demands of the U.S. presidency.

The Clinton administration's "even-handed" approach to India and Pakistan is above all a lever against New Delhi. It was, on the face of it, totally unrealistic of Indian politicians to expect Washington to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Such a pronouncement, bringing into play new sanctions against Pakistan, cannot be a part of the new American game plan.

It is thanks largely to India's own failings and shortsightedness and Pakistan's propaganda coup that have led to the salience human rights abuses have acquired in Kashmir. The decision to shut out Amnesty International merely gave it added incentive to ferret out cases, often giving currency to secondhand accounts. Even when offenders in Indian para-military and armed forces were brought to book, the codes of bureaucratic secretiveness saw to it that they remained unpublicised. It is only now that New Delhi is waking up to the damage its policies have been causing.

Human rights issues, like environmental concerns, are the icons of the last decade of the 20th century. On one plane, this heightened concern for protecting the rights and dignity of the individual is to be wholeheartedly welcomed. On another plane, living in the imperfect world we do, human rights can become a political lever to be used to reopen the Kashmir issue, as the U.S. is attempting, or to serve Pakistan's propaganda and political purposes.

The central question the new American approach to the subcontinental raises is how India can cope with the challenge while safeguarding its national interests. [sentence as published] For one thing, the going promises to be difficult, and Indian foreign policy makers must display nimble footwork and diplomatic finesse. But New Delhi must be clear in its mind on how far it can

accommodate American concerns and interests without sacrificing the country's vital interests.

The United States is India's largest trading partner and the biggest foreign private investor. It also has a dominant influence on how and on what terms international financial institutions will give assistance to India. And in today's circumstances, Washington can deny India supplies in any frontier technology area from those that have it; clandestine sales fall in another category.

There are three sets of problems India has with the United States: trade and related issues, questions of nuclear and missile non-proliferation, and political issues such as those concerning human rights and how to cope with Kashmir. The first set of issues, irritating as it can be, is the least dangerous because it concerns the larger world as well and forms a common strand in the policies of many developed and developing countries. Besides, the Indian economic reform process is continuing and U.S. investments and the volume of Indo-American trade are bound to grow.

Issues on nuclear and missile non-proliferation are the most contentious because the U.S. has set its heart on capping Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities.

Apart from more general goals, the justification offered is that Indo-Pakistani animosities and the Kashmir question make it conceivable that a war on the subcontinent could bring nuclear weapons into play. At the same time, Americans would perhaps argue that the question of Israel's nuclear weapons could be addressed only after the peace negotiations are successfully concluded. The difference really is that the U.S. has never been "even-handed" in its relations with Israel and its Arab neighbours.

New Delhi needs to think afresh on its opposition to the five-power meeting, the five to comprise the U.S., Russia and China, in addition to India and Pakistan. Although the proposal was first broached by Pakistan, its American authorship has been subsequently acknowledged. The danger, of course, is that three of the five could gang up on India for tactical reasons and Russia, as New Delhi has found to its cost, is a weak reed.

On the other hand, it could give India the opportunity to show how absurd a proposition it is to give a guardianship role to China, which, by the reckoning of American experts, is Pakistan's main supplier of nuclear and missile technology. And what rationale can there be to leave out Kazakhstan, a nuclear weapon power, from such a meeting?

The irony of the Indo-American relationship is that all the hopes that had blossomed after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of India's patron power have been dashed in a surprisingly short time. The Clinton administration has other priorities. Where its concerns converge on India, they usually spell trouble.

**Iran****Tehran Views Reason for U.S. Detention of PRC Ship**

NC1408074293 *Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0345 GMT 14 Aug 93*

[Commentary by News Commentaries Group]

[Text] Following the interception of a PRC vessel by U.S. warships, new political differences have erupted between the PRC and the United States, to which no clear solution seems to be in sight.

U.S. warships surrounded a PRC vessel at the entry to the Persian Gulf and blocked its passage. In justifying its action, the United States claimed that the PRC vessel was carrying chemical materials that could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. The PRC assistant foreign minister rejected U.S. allegations and described the contents of the consignment as writing materials, some metals, and machinery components.

While the U.S. secretary of state stressed that there is reliable information to prove that the Chinese vessel is carrying chemical materials and he mentioned inspection of the vessel, the PRC assistant foreign minister stressed the absence of any documentary or physical evidence to the effect and said: It is possible that the U.S. secretary of state is not well-informed of the facts pertaining to the PRC vessel.

The U.S. act of waylaying the PRC vessel based on claims that it was carrying chemical materials that can be used to manufacture chemical weapons happened at the same time as the convocation of the disarmament conference in Geneva. One of the main debates of the conference was the issue of chemical disarmament and the formulation of a convention to limit, stockpile, or use chemical weapons.

Political experts believe that the U.S. action at this juncture can be construed as an effort on the part of the United States to impose the views of the Western clique propounded at the disarmament conference. With this action, the United States seeks to drive home the impression that if the positions of the West are not given adequate importance, it will resort to force and military strength even in the event of a lack of consensus at the chemical disarmament convention.

At present, Western countries are stressing in all talks on the subject the need to limit chemical weapons. This limitation includes preventing the entry of chemical materials into developing countries. While accepting the principle of the dismantling and elimination of chemical weapons, developing countries reject limitations on chemical materials, as they interpret this as a restriction on their chemical industries. Efforts to resolve this difference of opinion continue.

Since resolving this difference of opinion is linked to generating a greater sense of trust between the two groups of countries, actions such as the U.S. interception of the PRC vessel only result in mistrust by countries. This, in turn, hinders the attainment of an international consensus on chemical disarmament.

**Israel****Firm Allegedly Smuggling Russian Arms to Middle East**

TA1908102793 *Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Aug 93 p 1*

[Report by Pazit Rabinal]

[Text] A Russian-American company made up of former KGB and CIA agents has been conducting huge deals, involving the smuggling of Russian weapons to Libya and Iraq. It is believed some of the arms shipments were intended for certain African countries. The company is headed by top executives in Russia's military-industrial conglomerate. The deals have been financed by Intura [as transliterated], a London-based firm with branches in Moscow and Zurich.

The smuggling operations have been carried out by Serbian and Croatian middlemen. The company has been operating under the cover of an oil drilling firm. The Americans are in charge of this aspect in the operations of the company, which is supposed to reactivate dilapidated oil fields in Russia.

The deals include tanks, anti-aircraft systems, missile launchers, antimissile early warning systems, armored vehicles, and technical assistance and training. Representatives of the company visited Israel in the past and looked into the possibilities of buying weapons in Israel for other target countries.

Italy's special antiterror unit yesterday arrested key members in the Russian-American smuggling ring: Two Serbs, Milivoj Regine, a key figure in the affair, and Miodrag Jovanovic; Dusan Markovic, a Croatian oil equipment expert; and Brian Charles Nalborough [names as transliterated], a British businessman.

The Italians put the value of the deal at \$75 million. The shipment had been scheduled to leave Russia through the Black Sea to its destination in the Middle East.

The huge arms deal was originally signed in 1989, before the disintegration of Yugoslavia. When the war broke out, the Yugoslavs transferred the deal to the Russians.

In the course of the operation of the Russian-American company, a proposal was received in Moscow to purchase components for tactical nuclear weapons. Suspecting a U.S. "sting" operation to entrap them, the Russian executives hired the services of a former federal agency worker to check out the order. After checking it, the former federal agent told the Russians that the order



had come from Serbian middlemen working on a Croatian Government project to manufacture uranium-plated ballistic missiles. Austrian sources confirmed that the Croatian Government has been carrying out a secret nuclear tactical project. The project is at an advanced stage and is scheduled to be completed by the end of this coming fall.

The Croats began their operation to attain uranium as far back as three years ago. The Roger-Boskovic [as transliterated] nuclear research institute in Zagreb has been involved in the search for the uranium and the manufacture of nuclear artillery shells. The institute tried to obtain nuclear material through middlemen of Intura [as transliterated], which purchased the uranium from Poland and South Africa.

#### **Sources Satisfied With Clinton Nuclear Weapons Initiative**

TA2308112493 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
23 Aug 93 p A1

[Report by defense affairs correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Excerpts] Next month, U.S. President Bill Clinton will publish his new initiative to stop the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The representatives of various governments, including Israel, have been briefed on the principles of this initiative in recent weeks. [passage omitted]

Israeli sources have expressed satisfaction with Clinton's new initiative, as presented to Israeli representatives. The sources noted that the Bush Administration had not bothered to consult with Israel before publishing its Middle East arms control initiative in May 1991. The sources asserted that the fact that the United States briefed Israel on the details of the Clinton initiative constitutes an indication of the positive change in relations between the two countries.

The Israeli sources said that Israel was not mentioned in the initiative, adding that Clinton would not present Israel with any direct demands.

The sources claimed that the U.S. demand for an unlimited extension of the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], with the participation of all countries, was not specifically directed against Israel, which is one of the few countries not to have signed the NPT. Nevertheless, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci said that Israel had to join the treaty.

The sources stressed that the United States had held no negotiations with Israel over the Clinton initiative; however, U.S. officials had discussed its details with Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich and senior Israeli Embassy officials.

Israel will apparently support the agreement on halting nuclear tests, in accordance with its long-standing policy to ban such testing, while coordinating its positions with

the United States. Israel is already a signatory to the partial agreement to ban nuclear tests (LTB) [Limited Test Ban].

#### **Relationship with DPRK Clarified**

##### **Deputy Foreign Minister Explains Halt in Contacts with DPRK**

TA1708102293 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew  
0405 GMT 17 Aug 93

[Live telephone interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Yosi Beilin by Hayim Zissowitz]

[Text] [Zissowitz] Deputy Foreign Minister Yosi Beilin, was it a mistake by Israel to conduct these direct contacts with North Korea?

[Beilin] It was not a mistake. Our job is to make every effort to reduce, or hopefully prevent, the sale of missiles that are capable of posing a threat to us to Iran, Syria, or any other country hostile to Israel. The question was whether the path we adopted...[changes thought] or rather, whether we were capable of meeting the North Korean demands, and the answer to that is no. In other words, the DPRK sought the kind of financial aid we could not even dream of giving. Therefore, at some stage these talks became unrealistic. Incidentally, the details of these contacts were well known to the Americans from the very beginning.

[Zissowitz] Are you saying that we clearly informed the United States about these contacts even before they were held?

[Beilin] Definitely. We informed the United States because we are aware of the Americans' problem with regard to North Korea. They have a real problem with this country, as do all of us; however, the United States, as the only superpower in the world, has to deal with a country that refuses to rescind its reservations about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], which it signed in 1985. The North Koreans at one stage completely pulled out of the NPT, and then partially relented. This was something we should never have gotten involved in.

[Zissowitz] Why did Washington not voice its reservations before the contacts started? Or was it Israel that did not accept Washington's objections?

[Beilin] No, the United States did not express any reservations. Washington clarified that this was a very sensitive matter that should first be carefully examined since it was a North Korean initiative. Afterward, when the DPRK revealed its demands, and the huge gap between our ability to help North Korea with agricultural seminars, etc., and their economic needs became apparent—after all, the country is in a terrible economic crisis—both Israel and the Americans realized that pursuing this lead would not ward off the threat to Israel. This encouraged the United States to express their position with regard to these contacts more firmly.

Incidentally, I am very pleased with the decision that was made yesterday. I fervently supported it, and I believe that now the United States has assumed a dual responsibility. Washington is not only responsible for stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it has also assumed a greater moral responsibility for Israel on the matter of missile proliferation, and this is the best thing we could have achieved.

**[Zissowitz]** Seeing as Israel failed to stop the continued supply of these missiles even when North Korea approached us with a request for vital aid, do you think that the United States can stop it with force? Do you think that force may work where economic incentives failed?

**[Beilin]** Look, the United States is already boycotting several countries whether against the background of human rights or internationally unacceptable behavior. Among other things, this involves the dual containment of Iran and Iraq. The United States can obviously employ means that are beyond the capabilities of Israel or even larger countries. These boycotts have quite a good chance of achieving political results, although there are always other countries violating the embargo. Ultimately, I believe that if any country is capable of preventing North Korea from selling these missiles, and I am not at all sure that this is possible, then it is the United States, certainly not Israel.

**[Zissowitz]** Was any progress whatsoever made during the contacts with North Korean representatives? Did they express any readiness to delay the shipment of missiles to our region when they approached us asking for our assistance. I assume we did our best to meet their request.

**[Beilin]** If I were to describe the whole thing in very rough terms, what North Korea told us was that they would not be so enthusiastic about selling missiles to Iran if someone else could come up with the sums that the Iranians paid for the weapons. Seeing as that was the North Korean proposal, I do not think that Israel or any other party could have just told them to go ahead and take the money.

**[Zissowitz]** Could Israel have offered North Korea the money it would have forfeited by not selling the missiles?

**[Beilin]** No, that is ridiculous. We are talking about huge sums. Personally, I would not have been happy had Israel expressed its readiness to give them the money, even assuming we were capable of meeting their demands, which is not the case. That would have really been an invitation to blackmail. Anyone contemplating selling weapons to our enemies would come and say: If you give us so and so billions of dollars we will stop the shipments. That does not strike me as the best policy for Israel.

**[Zissowitz]** Could we not have realized that before the contacts started and thus avoided the subsequent unpleasantness with the United States?

**[Beilin]** At the beginning, we did not really know what they wanted. We could have assumed that it had to do with economic cooperation and assistance through training or agricultural know-how. The same kind of relations we successfully pursue with many Third World countries. However, this was a totally different story and I am happy it ended this way.

**[Zissowitz]** Did these contacts damage Israel's relations with South Korea in any way?

**[Beilin]** I hope not. I cannot deny the fact that North Korea's neighbors were not pleased with these contacts.

**[Zissowitz]** Were there any official appeals to Israel to stop the contacts?

**[Beilin]** There were no official appeals to terminate the contacts, but there were requests to receive information about the meetings, which we supplied in full.

**[Zissowitz]** We have now fully placed our trust in the United States and entrusted Washington with stopping the proliferation of nuclear arms in the Middle East. If this does not work, does Israel still have any other means to act on this level? I am referring to diplomatic measures of course.

**[Beilin]** Look, if you are talking about Israel giving the North Koreans the huge sums they are asking for if the Americans, God forbid, fail to prevent the weapons sales, then I personally will issue a recommendation against this.

**[Zissowitz]** Thank you, Deputy Foreign Minister Yosi Beilin.

### Israeli Envoy Denies Aid Discussed With North Korea

SK1808113893 Seoul YONHAP in English 1124 GMT 18 Aug 93

**[Text]** Seoul, Aug. 19 (YONHAP)—Israel never discussed economic assistance or diplomatic normalization with North Korea in return for a halt to missile sales to the Middle East, its ambassador to Seoul Asher Na'im said Wednesday.

Israel met with North Korea for the first time last October without telling South Korea or the United States "to see what it would lead to," said Na'im in an interview with YONHAP at his ambassadorial residence.

Seoul and Washington, "not happy" as Na'im put it at Israel's separate channel of negotiation with Pyongyang, reacted immediately, and Tel Aviv gave prior notice to the two allies before the second meeting in Beijing in June.

But Washington said it will address the missile sale issue with Pyongyang and that it is better to act together than



separately, "and we accepted that," the ambassador said, emphasizing that talks with North Korea will stop for now.

The first meeting was arranged by "an American businessman," according to Na'im, who relayed to the Israeli Government that North Korea was willing to talk with Tel Aviv.

"It was a dialogue between the deaf," Na'im said of the two sessions.

"Israel talked about North Korea's missile sales. North Korea talked about economic assistance, developing mines and other things. We said can we first talk about this (missile sales). They didn't answer," he said.

North Korea, even as it was contacting Israel for further talks through its embassy in Beijing Aug. 11, is believed to have shipped its upgraded Soviet scud missiles to Syria, most likely destined for Iran.

"North Korea is an adversary of Israel, it is friends of those who don't like Israel," the envoy said.

The two countries never discussed diplomatic normalization or scale of economic assistance, he said. "we never reached that."

The Israeli Government, after the Aug. 11 message from North Korea for further talks, announced it is breaking off the contact on promise that Washington would do its part in resolving the issue of missile sales to countries hostile to Tel Aviv.

Seoul has not been to happy with the developments and had repeated Israel "should not rush too quickly in this," according to Na'im.

Asked if Israel will resume talks with Pyongyang if the latter agreed to halt missile sales, the ambassador avoided a direct answer, saying "I cannot address 'if' questions."

"The main problem is how Israel can act but still be within the consensus of the west," Na'im told YONHAP. "we don't want to appear to have broken ranks with our allies."

## Saudi Arabia

### Cabinet Approves Ban on Use, Development, Storage of CW

LD0908205493 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1740 GMT  
9 Aug 93

[Excerpts] Jeddah, 9 Aug [dateline as received]—Under the chairmanship of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Bin- 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Sa'ud, the Council of Ministers held its weekly session this afternoon of Monday 9 August 93 at al-Salam Palace in Jeddah.

The Information Minister 'Ali al-Sha'ir made a statement to SPA in which he said:

After a quick review of the political and security reports, and foremost the ones concerning the regrettable developments in the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the faltering peace negotiations, the custodian of the two holy mosques talked about his impressions and expectations concerning all current conditions at the Arab level, with a careful explanation of the nature of the period through which the Arab and Islamic nation had been passing. [passage omitted]

The information minister said that the custodian of the two holy mosques also briefed the Cabinet on the content of the letter he received from Kuwaiti Emir Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah which was delivered by 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Atiqi, the Kuwaiti emir adviser, and which falls within the framework of continuous and everlasting cooperation between the kingdom and the GCC. [passage omitted]

The Cabinet then took up the other subjects on the agenda and these include:

1. Approval of the agreement on banning the development, storage and use of chemical weapons, the destruction of those weapons as per the formula attached to the decision. A royal decree has been drawn up concerning this.

2. The Cabinet debated the draft project of setting up the Arab-American Chemical Investments Corporation and the Mobil company for petrochemicals. But in view of the need for a clear policy to be followed in investment in petrochemical industries by the state and by the private sector, the Cabinet decided to cancel the project. The custodian of the two holy mosques gave his directive in that a future plan should be drawn up in a manner in which the Saudi Company—ARAMCO, the Saudi private sector, and foreign companies would participate. [passage omitted]

## Russia

### Strategic Metals Smuggled From Submarine Construction Plant

LD2108125693 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1000 GMT 21 Aug 93

[Video report by correspondent Kiselev; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Northern Machine-Building Enterprise is the largest plant in the world producing nuclear submarines. The enterprise enjoys top secret status, with extremely strict security controls. But in spite of this, since the beginning of this year, several workers have managed to smuggle nearly 90 kilograms of tungsten from the plant. The tungsten electrodes are used in welding the component parts of the submarines, and are issued to workers in minute quantities, literally in grams. The total cost of the stolen tungsten—in today's market prices—is 60 million rubles. Seventy-three kilograms of this strategic raw material was uncovered in one of the workers' flats. The criminals managed to sell—probably to the Baltic states—nearly 20 kilograms.

Last year, 430 kilograms of Cerium—also a strategic material, worth 20 million rubles—were stolen from the territory of the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise. [Video shows the enterprise building and submarines moored, pin-shaped metal rods displayed with documents as investigation exhibits.]

### Agreement Reached on Dismantling Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons

LD2008112493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 0322 GMT 20 Aug 93

[From the "Radiostudio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] Russia and Ukraine have reached a mutual understanding on the question of the dismantling of nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory. Viktor Mikhaylov, Russia's minister of nuclear power engineering, a member of the Russian delegation at the talks in Kiev, said that the sides had reached agreement on the basic principles for compensation to Ukraine for the dismantling and for the nuclear materials.

The Russian minister categorically rejected the possibility that Ukraine could become a nuclear power in the near future. As if to confirm Viktor Mikhaylov's words, Ukraine's Defence Ministry press service has distributed a statement that states in essence, that the Ukrainian military are not elaborating, and are not trying to gain possession of the codes to control the strategic nuclear forces stationed on the territory of the republic.

### Threat of Nuclear Proliferation Eyed

PM0908121793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 6 Aug 93 p 1

[Manki Ponomarev article: "The Spread of Nuclear Death Across the World Must Be Halted. The Anniversary of the Atom Bombing of Hiroshima Calls for This"]

[Text] When American atom bombs wiped Hiroshima and Nagasaki off the face of the earth 48 years ago, very few people could imagine the terrible danger hanging over mankind. Only as time wore on did even the most unsophisticated people come to realize that a black shadow of nuclear self-destruction had descended on the world.

The United States' desire to retain for itself a monopoly on doomsday weapons in order to dictate its will to others was not to be realized. A few years went by, and other countries joined the "nuclear club"—the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China.

At the present time enormous stocks of nuclear explosives have been accumulated in the world—about 910 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium and approximately 1,300 tonnes of highly enriched uranium. Up to 40,000 nuclear weapons [boyezaryady] have been created. Their total yield is 1 million times that of the "Little Boy" atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It is possible that there would have been even more had the 25-year Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not appeared at the end of the 1960's. It came into force 5 March 1970. Its objective was to create a firm barrier to the proliferation of the most dangerous type of weapons of mass destruction, to ensure the necessary international verification of the implementation of the commitments assumed by the parties to the treaty, and to create extensive opportunities for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

The treaty specifically singles out the group of signatory states that possess nuclear weapons. They do not have the right to transfer such weapons or control over them to anyone else. Moreover, under no circumstances are they to assist, encourage, or induce any state that does not possess nuclear weapons to produce or acquire them.

As for signatory states that do not possess nuclear weapons, under the treaty they pledge not to accept such weapons from anyone else, not to produce or acquire them in any other way, and not to attempt to secure or to accept assistance in order to produce these weapons.

Verification of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is carried out with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], with which every signatory state that does not possess nuclear weapons concludes a corresponding agreement.

At the present time the treaty's signatories number approximately 160 world states, including the five great powers and UN Security Council members that possess such weapons. International conferences are convened

regularly, once every five years, to examine the way the treaty is operating, and the necessary recommendations to preserve and strengthen the nonproliferation regime are formulated. The fifth conference, at which the future of the treaty will have to be determined, is due to be held in 1995 [as published].

In this connection a rather sharp debate has arisen around the world regarding the treaty's basic provisions. The fact is that in addition to the five great powers, another half-dozen countries already possess, are producing, or are able to produce at least two and sometimes more types of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological—as well as the means to deliver them, or are attempting to acquire this potential. They include Israel, which according to certain reports has already accumulated 50 and possibly even 200 nuclear weapons; Pakistan, which possesses the components to make between five and seven nuclear bombs; and India, which tested an explosive nuclear device back in 1974. And it is no accident that all these three states are still refusing to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, saying, like India for example, that it is "discriminatory."

Iraq too has gone a long way toward developing nuclear weapons, despite the fact that in 1981 Israel bombed an experimental reactor in the suburbs of Baghdad that was producing fissionable material. Today many installations on Iraqi territory are being monitored by UN inspectors. The world community has grave doubts about the nuclear work that is being carried out by the DPRK in particularly secret conditions. There are a number of other states which, although signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nevertheless to a certain extent already possess the technology and potential to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Because of the spread of nuclear weapons the world has already more than once found itself on the brink of disaster. Moreover, it is not just the United States and the USSR which could bring the world to this point, as was the case, for example, during the Cuban missile crisis, but also other countries which are sometimes referred to "unofficially nuclear." Thus today it has emerged that at a time of sharply deteriorating relations between Pakistan and India in 1990, Islamabad put its nuclear forces in a state of combat readiness and Delhi prepared for a counterstrike.

The nuclear weapons nonproliferation problem has arisen with new force because of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Some of the former USSR's strategic nuclear forces are now on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Last spring they signed the so-called Lisbon Protocol, under which they pledged to ratify the START I Treaty, move to Russia the strategic offensive weapons located on their territory, and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as nonnuclear states.

To date only Belarus is fully implementing the pledges it assumed. It has ratified the START I Treaty, and two weeks ago in Washington it deposited the documents attesting to its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state. But Kazakhstan, although it has ratified the START I Treaty, has not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Ukraine is adopting an ambiguous position. At one moment its leaders (especially during foreign visits) state that they are renouncing nuclear weapons and will implement the Lisbon Protocol, at the next they take steps that place Ukraine in the category of nuclear states, for example subordinating "S" installations, i.e., nuclear-technical installations, stationed on its territory to the 43d Army. And then suddenly Kiev declares itself the owner of the nuclear weapons left on Ukrainian territory after the breakup of the USSR, and President Leonid Kravchuk himself asserts that in any case he will keep 46 SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, which allegedly do not fall within the ambit of the START Treaty. In this way, a Russian Federation Government statement published yesterday states, the regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is being undermined, and the future of the treaty itself is under threat.

Of course, attempts of this sort to "correct" international documents and commitments cannot have legal force. They only deepen the alarm of the world community which is already afraid that the destabilization of the situation on former USSR territory could lead to a weakening of control over nuclear weapons and the export of nuclear materials and technologies abroad.

In these conditions most countries, as far as can be judged at the present time, favor an unlimited-duration and unconditional extension of the validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, increasingly often ideas are being put forward which, going beyond the framework of the treaty, supplement and enlarge it and ultimately aim to fully rid mankind of nuclear weapons and the threats connected with them. These ideas include signing a treaty within the next year or two that completely and universally bans nuclear testing, halting the production of fissionable materials for military purposes until the end of the century, further cutting Russian Federation and U.S. nuclear arsenals to a level below that envisaged by the START I and START II Treaties, and the inclusion of Britain, France, and China in this process.

As far as Russia is concerned, it is resolutely in favor of preserving and strengthening the nonproliferation regime, which serves noble ends—ridding the Earth's inhabitants of the fear of finding themselves beneath the canopy of the nuclear mushroom. The mushroom which grew for the first time above Hiroshima and the entire planet 48 years ago—at 0815 hours on 6 August 1945.

**Yeltsin Orders Establishment of Chemical Arms Commission**

*LD1008105393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1051 GMT 10 Aug 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow August 10 TASS—In order to ensure the fulfillment of Russia's international commitments to destroy chemical weapons, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has ordered the Council of Ministers—Government of the Russian Federation to set up within a period of one month a government commission to select grounds for siting installations to destroy chemical weapons on Russian territory, the press service of the Russian President reported today.

The order stipulates in particular that in keeping with the Russian legislation installations to destroy chemical weapons should be sited in areas indicated by the above-mentioned commission and approved by the Russian president.

**Ukraine****Republic Accused of Selling Uranium at 'Dumping' Prices**

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0730 GMT 11 Aug 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York August 11 TASS—The U.S. International Trade Commission has accused Ukraine of selling highly enriched uranium for dumping prices and has imposed sanctions on it, according to which Ukrainian exporters of uranium, used for manufacture nuclear weapons, will have to pay duties equivalent to the price difference, the U.S. "Journal of Commerce and Commercial" reported on Tuesday with reference to its own sources.

The commission's decision came as a reply to the complaints of local uranium manufacturers and the international petroleum, chemical and atomic industry workers union. The journal stresses that Ukraine was accused of selling uranium in the United States at prices that should have been 115.82 per cent higher in accordance with the American laws ensuring their fair level.

The U.S. Department of Commerce had disclosed last year that Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were supplying to the American market uranium at 50 per cent of its market price. After that the governments of these countries promised to alter their price policy. However, the "Journal of Commerce and Commercial" says, the dumping sales are growing rapidly. The U.S. International Trade Commission has already arrived at the preliminary conclusion that the U.S. uranium industry had suffered huge losses as a result of such imports. The newspaper notes that if the other republics of the former Soviet Union did not stop the dumping, they would be subjected to similar sanctions.

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